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GARNER V. STATE: THE UNIT OF PROSECUTION FOR USE 
OF A HANDGUN IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF 
VIOLENCE IS THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE, NOT THE VICTIM 
OR CRIMINAL TRANSACTION; THE EVIDENCE 
CORROBORATED TWO SEPARATE HANDGUN 
CONVICTIONS; AND THE TRIAL COURT’S ONE-YEAR 
SENTENCE FOR THE SECOND USE OF A HANDGUN 
CONVICTION WAS ILLEGAL. 
 
By: Ashlyn J. Campos 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the unit of prosecution for 
Section 4-204 of the Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (“section 4-204”) 
is the individual crime of violence, not the victim or criminal transaction. 
Garner v. State, 442 Md. 226, 230, 112 A.3d 392, 394 (2015).  The court of 
appeals further held that separate handgun convictions are permitted when 
evidence supports multiple crimes or felonies.  Id. at 244, 112 A.3d at 402.  
Finally, the court held that a trial court does not possess the discretion to 
impose a sentence less than the mandatory five year minimum prescribed by 
section 4-204 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”).  Id. at 250-52, 112 A.3d at 
406-08.   
     On December 18, 2010, Terrance Garner (“Garner”) attempted to rob Ben 
WaBeya (“WaBeya”) at gunpoint.  When WaBeya did not comply with 
Garner’s demands, Garner shot him twelve times in the legs and stomach area. 
Garner then stood over WaBeya and discharged a final shot into WaBeya’s 
neck.   
     Garner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and sentenced 
to thirty years imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, twenty years 
to be served consecutively for one count of use of a handgun in the commission 
of a crime of violence, fifteen years to be served concurrently for attempted 
robbery with a dangerous weapon, and a consecutive one year sentence for the 
second count of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.  
     Garner appealed and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed 
the circuit court, holding that separate consecutive sentences for Garner’s use 
of a handgun convictions were legal. The court of special appeals judicially 
noted that it was not illegal to impose a one-year sentence for a violation of 
section 4-204 under the plain language of the statute. Garner petitioned for a 
writ of certiorari and the State conditionally cross-petitioned to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland. The court granted both petitions.   
     The court of appeals first addressed Garner’s contention that the unit of 
prosecution for a violation of section 4-204 is the victim of the crime of 
violence or the criminal transaction. Garner, 442 Md. at 235, 112 A.3d at 397.  
To ascertain the proper statutorily prescribed unit of prosecution, the court 
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looked to the legislative intent of the statute.  Id. at 236-38, 112 A.3d at 397-
400. Legislative intent is clarified through applying the general rules of 
statutory interpretation, which begin with an evaluation of the plain language 
and meaning of the statute and a review of the statutory history.  Id. at 236-37, 
112 A.3d at 398. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, no further 
analysis is warranted. Id. at 237, 112 A.3d at 398 (citing State v. Weems, 429 
Md. 329, 337, 55 A.3d 921, 926 (2012)).   
     Section 4-204 provides that “a person may not use a firearm in the 
commission of a crime of violence... or any felony.”  Garner, 442 Md. at 238, 
112 A.3d at 399 (citing CL § 4-204).  The court found the plain language to 
be clear and unambiguous. Id. at 242, 112 A.3d 401.  However, the “plain 
language must be read within the context of the statutory scheme” and the 
court will not ignore signs that the plain language conflicts with the “purpose, 
aim, or policies” the drafters intended. Id. at 237, 112 A.3d at 398 (citing 
Weems, 429 Md. at 337, 55 A.3d at 926).   
     To ensure the legislative intent and purpose of the statute were correctly 
interpreted, the court reviewed the statutory history.  Garner, 442 Md. at 237, 
112 A.3d at 398. Prior to the enactment of section 4-204, Art. 27, § 36B(d) 
(“Art. 27”) was the governing statute for use of a handgun offenses.  Id. at 
238-39, 112 A.3d at 399.  In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
concluded that the unit of prosecution for Art. 27 was the crime of violence or 
felony committed with a handgun. Id. at 239, 112 A.3d at 399. (citing Brown 
v. State, 311 Md. 426, 434-35, 53 A.2d 482, 486 (1988)).  The Brown court 
opined that the victim and the criminal transaction were irrelevant factors in 
determining the unit of prosecution for Art. 27.  Id. at 239-40, 112 A.3d at 
399-400. (citing Brown, 311 Md. at 434-35, 53 A.2d at 486).  The Garner court 
found no reason to believe that the legislature intended section 4-204 to be 
interpreted differently than Art. 27. Id. at 240-41, 112 A.3d at 401. 
     After reviewing the legislative history and examining the plain language of 
section 4-204, the court of appeals concluded that the statute criminalizes 
using a handgun during every felony or crime of violence.  Garner, 442 Md. 
at 242-43, 112 A.3d at 401-02.  Thus, the proper unit of prosecution for a 
violation of section 4-204 is the crime of violence committed with a handgun.  
Id.  Additionally, as long as there is evidence of multiple crimes of violence 
and evidence that each of those crimes is committed with a handgun, each 
crime of violence will sustain its own distinct handgun conviction.  Id. at 243-
44, 112 A.3d at 402-03.   
     Next, the court addressed Garner’s alternative argument that under the 
court’s prior decision in Johnson v. State, either the rule of lenity, the required 
evidence test, or the principle of fundamental fairness mandated separate 
handgun sentences to be merged.  Garner, 442 Md. at 246, 112 A.3d at 404.  
The court, however, was unpersuaded that merger is required under the rule of 
lenity.  In Johnson, the statute that regulated sentencing for a use of a handgun 
offense was ambiguously written and has since been superseded.  Id. (citing 
Johnson v. State, 56 Md. App. 205, 219, 467 A.2d 544, 550-51(1983)).  The 
court further concluded that merger is not required under the required evidence 
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test or the principle of fundamental fairness because the two handgun 
convictions are not “part and parcel” of each other and the elements of the 
underlying crimes attached to the convictions are unrelated.  Id. at 249-50, 112 
A.3d at 406.  
     Finally, the court addressed the State’s argument that a one-year sentence 
for a use of a handgun conviction was illegal.  Garner, 442 Md. at 250, 112 
A.3d at 406.  Pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a), “the court may correct an illegal 
sentence at any time,” including on appeal.  Id. at 250-51, 112 A.3d at 406. 
Section 4-204(c) provides that a person convicted for use of a handgun in the 
commission of a crime of violence “shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
not less than 5 years.”  Id. at 252, 112 A.3d at 407.  Therefore, the imposition 
of a one-year sentence was illegal because it is less than the mandatory 
minimum prescribed by the statute.  Id.  
     In Garner, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a violation of section 
4-204 permits separate consecutive sentences, the unit of prosecution is the 
crime of violence, and the mandatory minimum sentencing clause is a hard-
floor component of the statute. The court’s decision significantly empowers 
prosecutors in plea-bargaining, because they will be able to utilize the statute’s 
mandatory five-year sentence as leverage over the defendant. This decision 
also advances society’s interest against gun violence, given that no sentencing 
leniency will be afforded to defendants who are convicted of handgun crimes. 
Furthermore, this decision may discourage practitioners from presenting 
merger arguments because the Garner court found no merit in the three rules 
that require merger of sentences.  With the enactment of section 4-204, it is 
clear that the courts will be punishing handgun crimes to their fullest extent.  
